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Fundamental to the design of a secure public-key cryptosystem (PKC) is the dis-
covery of a difficult to solve problem and an associated solution which is easy to
verify. In practice these problems are hard to find, and it is even more difficult to
prove their difficulty. This forces system designers to rely on a plausible assump-
tion of difficulty. However, developments in quantum computing, such as Shor’s
algorithm [5], have challenged these assumptions in existing popular systems.
This has led to a search for systems based on problems which remain difficult
in a post-quantum world. An important part of evaluating these systems is to
ensure that they also remain secure against traditional (non-quantum) attacks.
This poster outlines two systems based on problems that are currently thought to
be hard, even for quantum computers, and traditional attacks on these systems,
known as Reaction Attacks, introduced by Hall, Goldberg and Schneier [3].
Public-Key Cryptography
Suppose that Bob would like to send Alice a secret message. One way to accom-
plish this is to have Alice set up a public lock-box with a one-way slot for accepting
letters and only one key, which she owns. Bob can then send his secret message
by putting it into the box. He knows that Alice will be the only one who can read it
as she owns the only key to the box. Alice and Bob’s system captures the essence
of a PKC. The idea of a box which cannot be opened easily by anyone but Alice,
since she owns the only key, captures the concept of how the hard problems with
easy to verify solutions described in the introduction are used.
A PKC can be separated into three parts:
• Key Generation: Choose a private and public key, these are analogous to
Alice’s lock-box key and lock-box, respectively.
• Encryption Algorithm: Analogous to placing a message in the lock-box.
• Decryption Algorithm: Analogous to opening the lock-box with the key.























As in the introduction, one way to break a PKC is to attack the difficulty of its
underlying hard problem. However, this is not the only way a system can be
attacked. A reaction attack circumvents the system by taking advantage of an "in-
formation leak" when observing Alice’s reaction to a decrypted message. In our
lock-box analogy, suppose that Eve can discern information about Bob’s message
by watching how Alice reacts after reading his message. Eve can then attempt to
recover Bob’s message from an intercepted ciphertext by sending specific mes-
sages to Alice and observing her reactions.
McEliece Cryptosystem
In 1978, McEliece [4] introduced a new PKC based on the difficulty of decoding arbi-
trary linear codes. A linear code can be thought of as an encoder which turns mes-
sages into codewords and a decoder capable of removing a limited number of errors
from a codeword before returning a message. McEliece’s cryptosystem is outlined as
follows.
• Key Generation:
1. Choose G a k×n generator matrix for a t-error correcting binary linear code,
S a random k×k invertible matrix and P a random n×n permutation matrix.
2. Publish Keypublic = G
′ = SGP and securely store Keyprivate = (S, P,G).
• Encryption Algorithm: For the message m, a binary vector of length k, compute
the ciphertext c = mG′ + e, where e is a random binary vector of length n and
weight t. The ciphertext is a "scrambled" codeword with t errors added.
• Decryption Algorithm:
1. Compute c′ = cP−1, a codeword of the linear code G with errors.
2. Remove errors from c′ using the t−error correcting decoder to get m′ = mS.
3. Compute m = m′S−1.
Alice Bob
Generate scrambled
code G′ = SGP G
′














Reaction Attack Against McEliece
Suppose Eve intercepts c, a ciphertext which Bob intended to send to Alice. Eve can
retrieve Bob’s original message m from c using the following algorithms:
Algorithm A: Compute c′, a ciphertext with exactly t + 1 errors.
1. Let i = 1.
2. Let c′ equal c with bits 1 through i flipped and determine if c′ decodes correctly by
sending it to Alice and observing her reaction.
3. If so, then increase i by 1 and repeat step 2. Otherwise return c′.
Algorithm B: Locate and remove errors in c′.
1. One bit at a time, flip each bit of c′ to form c′′ and determine if c′′ decodes correctly
as in Algorithm A.
2. If so, record the bit as an error. If all bits have been flipped remove the recorded
errors from c′ and return c′′′, an error-free scrambled codeword. Otherwise con-
tinue to the next bit.
Algorithm C: Compute Bob’s message m.
1. Choose k bits of c′′′ such that G′k, the k × k matrix formed by the corresponding
columns of G′, is invertible.
2. Compute m = (ck)G
′−1
k , where ck is the vector formed by the k bits of c
′′′.
Modified Ajtai-Dwork Cryptosystem
In 1997, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [2] presented a modified version of a
cryptosystem from Ajtai and Dwork [1] based on the assumed difficulty of the hidden
hyperplane problem. This modified system is outlined below.
• Key Generation:
1. Specify a security parameter n and securely store Keyprivate = u, a random
vector in the open unit ball of Rn.
2. Use u to choose two lists of vectors, denoted v = (v1, ..., vr) and w =
(w1, ..., wn), and an index i1 ∈ {1, . . . r}. Publish Keypublic = (v,w, i1).
• Encryption Algorithm: For a binary vector m each bit mj is encrypted as a




i bivi modulo P (w), the fundamental parallelepiped of w.
• Decryption Algorithm: For a ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , cj) each ci is decrypted as
0 if 〈u, ci〉 is within 1/4 of an integer and 1 otherwise.
Reaction Attack Against Modified Ajtai-Dwork
Assume there exists an oracle O(v) which returns the plaintext obtained when de-
crypting the single vector v. Eve can use this oracle and the following algorithms to
retrieve Alice’s private key u = (u1, . . . , un):
Algorithm D: Determine the binary expansion of |ui| for each i.
1. Specify r and let |ui| = d0.d1, . . . dr be the binary expansion with d0 = 0.
2. For each j ≥ 0 compute dj+1 = O(v)⊕ dj, where v is the vector with 2j−1 as the
ith component and 0 everywhere else.
Algorithm E: Determine the sign of ui for each i.
1. Assume u1 > 0. For each j > 1 compute u1 + |uj|, u1 − |uj| and determine the
first bit k in which u1 + |uj| and u1 − |uj| differ.
2. Determine the kth bit of u1 + uj, and therefore the sign of uj, by computing O(v)
where v is the vector with 2k−3 in the 1st and jth components and zero elsewhere.
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